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The term public opinion first gained popularity the 18th Century European 
enlightenment. Today, because of its centrality to the rationale of advanced liberal 
democracies, public opinion constitutes a nexus between the worlds of formal and 
everyday politics.  This chapter outlines a tension between two competing 
assumptions about the relationship between public opinion and rational democratic 
governance.  On the one hand, public opinion is treated as the ultimate source of 
political authority. On the other hand, the everyday opinion of mass publics is 
understood to be too heavily motivated by personal self-interest, and too deficient in 
factual understanding to ever serve as a legitimate basis for the governance of 
complex modern societies. In the second part of the chapter I present a case study 
from my own research on vernacular political reasoning, which draws upon early 
social psychological recommendations concerning the conceptualization and 
empirical study of public opinion.  This perspective sheds light on the phenomenon of 
empty attitudes: sincere opinions on matters of public debate that can be satisfactorily 
justified without recourse to detailed factual information.  
 
Public Opinion as an ambiguous concept. 
 In his 1965 text, Public Opinion, Harwood Childs famously listed 50 
definitions of the term. Since that time it has become almost obligatory for authors to 
start out by reflecting on the polyvalence of the composite term and of each of its 
subcomponents. These different theoretical understandings underlie a dilemmatic 
orientation to the status of public opinion in relation to strategies of rational and 
reasonable governance. On the one hand, public opinion is understood as the 
mechanism by which thick political communities are formed and through which 
citizens realize their potential as active political subjects. On the other hand, public 
opinion is viewed as a mechanism for, and object of, political surveillance and 
regulation1.  
 For social scientists, precision is generally regarded as a sine qua non of 
academic life (Billig, 2013), and since the 1920s authors have suggested that 
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difficulties in reaching a consensual definition might preclude the adoption of public 
opinion as a technical concept (see Palmer, 1936). However, as the topic of 
intellectual or political debate, the ambiguity of the term public opinion may also 
have positive affordances. Sociologists of science have shown how vague constructs 
facilitate academic innovation and interdisciplinary cooperation. Psychologists, 
linguists and students of organizational culture emphasize the role of fuzzy logic in 
everyday cognition and communication. Studies of political communication have 
noted the advantages of strategic ambiguity for communicators wishing to future-
proof their rhetoric, or to appeal simultaneously to diverse audiences.  
 As an example, we may consider how politicians invoke public opinion in the 
course of political debate. Perhaps the most straightforward cases involve what Drury 
(2014) calls ad populum arguments, in which speakers align themselves with existing 
public opinion. In terms of theories of democratic representation (e.g. Rehfeld, 2006) 
we might gloss these as situations in which politicians adopt – in appearance at least - 
a delegate footing. Ad populum arguments need not entail simple appeals to common 
category membership (cf. Haslam et al., 2011). Rather, they often involve a speaker 
simultaneously identifying with an immediate audience, whilst at the same time 
excluding that audience from the public with whose opinions they are aligning. In the 
following example, taken from a UK House of Commons debate over EU 
immigration in 2013, the speaker represents the political landscape in terms of two 
opposing camps: public opinion (elided with British citizens, the British people, and 
constituents), versus this esteemed House of Commons of whom those of our 
colleagues who are absent this Chamber this morning are treated as category 
prototypes:  
 British citizens are concerned that immigration from the European  Union is 
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 on far too large a scale. It is not about the colour of  somebody’s skin or the 
 skills that they can bring, but about the numbers of people…That is the 
 concern of the British people. I am afraid that this esteemed House of 
 Commons is out of step with public opinion. The fact that fewer than 15 out of 
 650 hon. Members are in this Chamber this morning suggests to me that far 
 too many of our colleagues are not listening closely enough to their 
 constituents. The big issue in the country, about which people are talking 
 every day of the week, is immigration.2 
 In other situations, politicians may employ what Drury terms contra populum 
arguments, establishing the rationality of their own political judgment through 
contrast with the ill-informed, unreliable or antisocial forces of public opinion. In the 
extract below, taken from a UK Justice Committee Report, the author is adopting a 
trustee model of democratic representation, in which elected Ministers have a duty to 
exercise their own expert judgment to protect the interests of their constituents and the 
State. 
 Wider factors, such as the media, public opinion and political rhetoric, 
 contribute to risk averse court, probation and parole decisions and hence play 
 a role in unnecessary system expansion. If Ministers wish the system to 
 become sustainable within existing resources, they must recognize the 
 distorting effect which these pressures have on the pursuit of a rational 
 strategy.3 
 Formal political rhetoric does not simply embed contemporary publics and 
their current opinions, but also enlists the public in projections of the future.  
Politicians often appeal to latent public opinion (Key, 1961): future reactions on the 
part of a public. The following example comes from the Second Reading of the 
Scotland Bill in the UK House of Commons in 19984 
 Far too many people seem to have forgotten what English nationalism is 
 capable of. Even the briefest scanning of the history of the United Kingdom 
 should be enough to remind us all: rape, pillage and mayhem leap from 
 virtually every page of that history. Throughout Scotland, Wales and Ireland 
 there are countless monuments to the local heroes who were slain in a vain 
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 attempt to stem a relentless tide of English domination. It is worth looking 
 back at what history has to teach us.  
  
 
 UK Parliamentary debates concerning the Scotland Bill typically displayed a 
nonsymmetrical stance towards public opinion.  On the one hand, the population of 
Scotland, who had voted in favour of a separate Scottish Parliament in a referendum, 
was generally represented as a unitary citizenry with rights to political voice. In 
contrast, the population of England typically entered Parliamentary debate through 
contra populum arguments. This asymmetric representation was particularly evident 
among MPs representing constituencies in England, who often presented themselves 
as trustees of the British State, defending the minority national publics from the 
impeding threat of popular English ochlocracy. Speakers regularly added literary 
embellishment to these representations through quotation from G.K. Chesterton’s 
poem The Secret People, as illustrated by following example from a House of 
Commons debate in 1998: 
 The ugly ogre of English nationalism, which I detest, will begin to  march 
 soon unless it is forestalled. The Government have lit a camp fire of concern 
 in England, which will soon burn into a forest fire unless we address it 
 speedily. As G. K. Chesterton wrote in 1915, 
 "Smile at us, pay us, pass us: but do not quite forget.  For we are the 
 people of England, that have never spoken yet"--   
 and they will speak soon.5 
 
 
 
Technologies of representation. 
 
 In 1921, Lord Bryce answered his own rhetorical question, “How is the drift 
of public opinion to be ascertained?” as follows: 
 The best way in which the tendencies at work in any community can be 
 discovered and estimated is by moving freely about among all sorts and 
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 conditions of men…In every neighborhood [sic] there are unbiased 
 persons with good opportunities for observing, and plenty of skill in 
 ‘sizing up’ the attitude and proclivities of their fellow citizens… (p. 156)  
 
This example reminds us that until the 1930s, if one wished to monitor public 
opinion, the only available options were a census, the kind of informal ethnography 
advocated by Bryce (and exemplified in the UK by Mass Observation), or straw polls 
such as those regularly conducted by US newspapers. Since this time, of course, the 
study of public opinion has become almost synonymous with the polling method 
popularized by George Gallop, which combines standardized, closed-ended 
questioning with representative sampling (Osborne & Rose, 1999).  
 As the title of their text, The Pulse of Democracy, suggests, Gallop and Rae 
(1940) promoted opinion polling as a practical technology for conveying citizens’ 
views to their political representatives. The new technology was not, however, 
without its critics. As early as 1948, Blumer noted that, “those trying to study public 
opinion by polling are so wedded to their technique and so preoccupied with the 
improvement of their technique that they shunt aside the vital question of whether 
their technique is suited to the study of what they are ostensibly seeking to study. 
Their work is largely merely making application of their technique” (p.542). One 
consequence of what Blumer called the “operationistist position”, according to which 
“public opinion consists of what public opinion polls poll” (p. 543), was that research 
on public opinion rapidly became disconnected from academic theory in social 
psychology (Allport, 1937), political science (Price, 1992) and sociology (Manza & 
Brooks, 2012).  This is not to say that polling methods were conceptually neutral.  On 
the contrary, this technology constructed public opinion in a way that reinforced 
dominant understanding of democratic participation in the mid twentieth century USA 
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(Herbst, 1993).  Polling methods resemble the private ballot, one-man-one-vote, 
method of democratic participation. Reports of opinion polls present an image of the 
public sphere as an undifferentiated mass society, comprised of essentially 
disconnected individuals thinking and (re)acting in parallel. In principle, pollsters 
could draw attention to the range of opinions existing within their target populations. 
In practice, public opinion tends to be equated with majority-preferred response 
options, in a manner analogous to majority rule decision-making. Channeled through 
the polls, the voice of the people is heard simply reacting to policy options rather than 
engaging in constructive public deliberation. 
 
The problem of information. 
 Promoting opinion polling as the technology of choice for democratic 
governance during World War II, Gallop and Rae (1940) emphasized that that 
political “ignorance, stupidity and apathy are the exception, not the rule” (p. 287). A 
quarter of a century later, under different political circumstances, Philip Converse 
(1964) famously argued that the majority of the US electorate did not possess 
“meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political 
controversy among elites for substantive periods of time” (p. 245). He argued that poll 
responses were rarely informed by politically sophisticated, internally consistent, 
abstract (ideological) reasoning.  On the contrary, they often took the form of non-
attitudes: answers produced by individuals who had no meaningful understanding of 
the topics on which their views were solicited. Converse’s account of the rational 
shortcomings of mass publics resonated with deficit models of public opinion that had 
been popular since Lippmann’s (1922) seminal treatise, and generated a heated debate 
that continues to the present day. 
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 Converse was not the first to question the epistemological status of the 
“opinions” revealed through polling methods.  In one early critique, Riesman and 
Glazer (1949) argued that a “real understanding” of public opinion “will only 
come…when polling moves away from an emphasis on set answers to set questions to 
an emphasis on the ‘latent’ meaning of answers, understood in terms of an entire 
interview and a grasp of what went on in the interpersonal situation of the interview” 
(p. 633).  Similarly, social psychologists often challenged polling technologies, 
advocating “full discussion” as a preferable method for studying public opinions (e.g. 
Likert, 1947; Murphy & Likert, 1938; see J. Converse, 1987; Lazarsfeld, 1944), a 
position summarized by Asch (1952): 
Perhaps we ought to take the bull by the horns and insist that an interview 
should approximate to a genuine conversation, in which one person explores a 
problem with another; perhaps the interviewer’s optimum role is not that of a 
camera or a ballot box.  It may even be of value to observe how the person 
deals with facts and arguments that are new to him, to confront him with 
problems…Such procedures would approximate more closely to the 
requirements of psychological investigation and might prove fruitful for 
theory (pp. 559-560). 
 
 Prefiguring Converse’s critique, Asch noted “the problem of information”:  
the “danger of polling on matters about which there is little information and in which 
people are not interested is that the data will spuriously support the assumption that a 
public opinion exists” (p. 550). Unlike Converse, however, Asch regarded the 
problem of information as but one instance of a more general problem of interpreting 
poll data: 
 the information obtained from [closed ended opinion poll] questions is the 
 distribution of the number of people who say “yes” or “no”; the rest is 
 interpretation. For interpretation one must rely upon a knowledge of … 
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 ideas that the data has neither produced nor is capable of checking. The data 
 make sense to us only because we have … some idea of the “why” of the 
 answers (pp. 546-7). 
 
Opinionation without information: A case study of everyday political reasoning. 
 For the past 15 years, my colleagues and I have been studying not only the 
“whats” and the “whys”, but also the “hows” of everyday political reasoning using the 
kinds of methods advocated by the early social psychologists. In particular, we have 
considered how an analytic focus on the ways in which people formulate political 
arguments in conversational contexts can enable us to appreciate the rationale behind 
those kinds of opinions (or non-opinions) that survey researchers are inclined to treat 
as prima facie evidence of citizen ignorance, irrationality and democratic 
incompetence (e.g. Condor & Gibson, 2007; Condor 2010; 2011; 2012; Sapountzis & 
Condor, 2013).  
 For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on what Asch termed the 
“problem of information”. First, I will consider how an analysis of the rhetorical 
construction of opinion can enable us to appreciate the extent and kinds of factual 
information that people actually use when they discuss political issues. Second, I will 
demonstrate how conversational data can provide us with insights into the rhetorical 
heuristics that people employ in situations where they are unable to justify a particular 
political stance with detailed factual information or claims to epistemic authority (cf. 
Heritage, 2005). 
 
Background to the research. 
In the late 1990s, the UK government initiated a process of political 
decentralization that included the establishment of a new Scottish Parliament. As we 
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have already seen, the spectre of latent English public opinion featured heavily in 
subsequent parliamentary debates.  The Earl of Onslow summed up the concerns of 
many when, during the second reading of the Scotland Bill in the UK House of Lords 
in June 1998, he asserted that, “The English simply will not put up with it”.  The 
polls, however, generally failed to substantiate these pessimistic predictions. In 2001, 
Curtice and Seyd argued that the poll data indicated that, “A Scottish parliament 
appears not only to be the settled will6 of Scots but also of the English” (p. 163). This 
gloss illustrates Bourdieu’s (1973) argument concerning the “consensus effect” of 
polling. Granted, none of the polls had indicated a groundswell of opposition to the 
new constitutional settlement. However, neither did they point to a consensus in 
favour. The depiction of English public opinion as settled was – in the absence of 
longitudinal evidence – clearly speculative, and overlooked the susceptibility of the 
survey findings to question wording and ordering effects (Bryant, 2008). The 
interpretation of the poll data as evidence of a definitive national will also involved, to 
echo Asch, ideas that the data had neither produced nor was capable of checking.  
 One possibility overlooked by the pollsters was that these survey responses 
might not reflect genuine attitudes at all. Did people in England actually possess the 
necessary information to answer questions about the new Scottish Parliament in any 
meaningful way? On the face of it, there were grounds for skepticism.  There had 
been little press coverage of the devolution debates in in England (Rosie et al, 2006), 
and the poll data (characterized by a disproportionate use of “don’t know”, and non-
extreme response options) was consistent with the possibility that the respondents 
were using satisficing strategies (cf. Krosnik et al 1996)7.  
 In the absence of information concerning everyday understandings of the 
devolution process in England, my colleagues and I explored this issue through an 
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interviewing strategy designed to elicit accounts that would, as far as possible, reflect 
the vocabulary and lines of argument that people might use in their everyday lives8.  
Respondents were recruited using maximum diversity sampling, and the eventual data 
corpus comprised 1928 recordings of informal “chats” with individuals and groups of 
friends or family members9. A sub-set of panel data involved repeat interviews with 
the same individuals, designed to monitor change over time10. 
 
Empty attitudes and rhetorical heuristics.    
 Opinions towards the Scottish Parliament expressed in our studies paralleled 
trends identified by the polls, with about 70% of participants claiming neutral or 
positive attitudes. Basic content analysis was sufficient to discount the possibility that 
these were simply spurious responses (Goldsmith, 2001) to questions that the 
respondent had not understood. The interviews were conducted in such a way as to 
enable respondents to raise issues spontaneously. Under these circumstances, more 
than 90% of our participants demonstrated prior awareness of the new Scottish 
Parliament. However, this was not to say that they displayed much specific 
information concerning the devolution process. In fact, 60% of our respondents 
discussed the changes to the UK constitution at some length without mobilizing any 
factual information other than general background knowledge (e.g. Scotland’s always 
had its own legal system) or information which could be inferred from a mere 
awareness of the Scottish Parliament’s existence (e.g. they make their own decisions).  
 Respondents sometimes mentioned their lack of knowledge in the course of 
justifying neutral opinions (see extract 1, below). However, most respondents who 
argued in favour of the new Scottish Parliament did so without mobilizing any topic-
specific information. As we shall see shortly, these empty attitudes (Condor, 2012) 
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could be warranted in a range of ways, and could prove to be surprisingly reliable 
over time and across conversational contexts. 
 Everyday political talk tends to be formulated with a view to norms of public 
reason: that is, assumptions about the kinds of positions, and forms of intervention, 
that are (and are not) typical, expected, or appropriate for members of particular 
communities.  Interestingly, our respondents commonly treated a lack of information 
about the Scottish Parliament as typical of, and as uncontroversial within, their 
opinion community:  
EXTRACT 111 
I So, going back to what you said about the Scottish Parliament. Um. What 
 were your thoughts on that at the time? 
Karen Err. I’m not sure. I’m not sure. 
I What about now? Do you think it was a good idea? Or [1.5] 
Karen I don’t think I have an opinion one way or the other [1]  
I So it’s not something that interests you? 
Karen Well, I wouldn’t say that. I think you know it’s interesting but I just don’t 
 know that much about it. You don’t hear much about it down here do you? So 
 it’s difficult to have an opinion one way or the other. 
 
 Respondents could also treat ignorance as normative in a prescriptive sense, 
suggesting that the English public lacked category entitlement to factual information 
on the devolution debates or process. In the following extract, the respondent 
characterizes the English public as a latent mob in a manner that parallels the forms of 
representations employed by MPs in Parliamentary debates:  
 
EXTRACT 2 
 
I Did you think that was the right decision? 
Mark Well yeah. Of course. They had a referendum and that’s what they decided. 
I And it was the right decision? 
Mark Well, it’s hardly for us to say, is it? It’s up to them. And that’s what they 
 voted for. That’s democracy.  
I Some people have been saying that it wasn’t a very good decision. 
	   13	  
Mark I wouldn’t know about that. I have not heard much about it. You don’t really 
 hear anything in the newspapers, or on the Today programme of whatever you 
 know. 
I Do you think that maybe there should be more information in the media? 
Mark Well:: not really. I don’t really see it as being any of our business.  
I Some people I think say that people in England should at least know what is 
 going on in other parts of the United Kingdom (2) that they have a a right- 
Mark –yeah they probably do [laugh] well of course there will always be trouble 
 makers. People out for a fight. People who are going to be like, “What about 
 the English?” And that’s I dunno but I wouldn’t be surprised if that's what 
 Scotland wanted a different umm parliament to get away from all of that so 
 they could just make the decisions for themselves without all of that nonsense 
 that they’ve always had to put up with across (.) history. 
 
  Respondents were also inclined to attribute the English public with limited 
rights to hold, or to publicly express, negative opinions towards the Scottish 
Parliament. Heritage (1984) has noted that contra-normative statements are liable to 
be accounted for, delayed within a turn and to be prefaced or qualified.  These 
features were always present when English people voiced negative views of the new 
Scottish Parliament (see e.g. extract 6).  In contrast, the expression of positive 
opinions was typically treated as normatively unaccountable, an orientation which 
could be discursively marked through argumentative elision, and the use of the 
generic you and rhetorical just.  
 Respondents could treat simple affirmation (yes; of course) or default 
arguments ( why not?12) as sufficient justification for positive opinions: 
EXTRACT 3 
 
I  Mm. Okay. Do you think places like, countries like Scotland, and like 
 Wales, and like Northern Ireland, are entitled to have their own 
 parliaments?  
Joyce Yes.  
I Why? (2)  
Joyce Now then, actually, I can’t express it, positively  
 ((laughter))  
 at all, but I can’t see any reason why not. 
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Gigerenzer (2015) defines one-reason decisions as a “a class of heuristics that bases 
judgments on one good reason only…” (p. 124). The rhetorical parallel, often 
apparent in our respondents’ arguments in favor of the Scottish Parliament, was the 
use of a single bottom-line (cf. Potter et al., 1994) consideration. This could involve a 
bald allusion to the legitimacy of Scottish public opinion (If that’s what they want) 
possibly coupled with references to procedural justice (that’s democracy; fair 
enough).  One common rhetorical heuristic involved generic assertions of Scottish 
difference, formulated as a matter of political needs: 
EXTRACT 4 
Dan  Yeah, it [the Scottish parliament] was a good idea.  
I  It was a good idea. Why was it a good idea? 
Dan  Because, it was. I think they're different from us and therefore they need 
different things. I think there should be collaboration between the two but I 
think giving them the parliament was a good idea.  
I  How are they different from us?   
Dan  Different lifestyles.  
I  What's different about them?  
Dan  I don't know. Perhaps their principles, the way they live, their lifestyles. Erm, I 
don't know, it's really hard to say, I think, but just an impression you get. 
 
or distinctive identity: 
EXTRACT 5 
 
Jerry […]  And especially now with Britain breaking up. We need to know which 
 bit we  are. It’s like it can’t just be “we’re all British” you know, because the 
 Scots have their own identity, they’re “We’re not British, we’re Scottish” and 
 the Welsh too they’ve always been really Welsh. And now with the new 
 Parliaments I suppose it’s really only some people in Northern Ireland who are 
 really like, “wahh we’re British”. 
I Is that something you were in favour of? The new parliaments? 
Jerry Oh yes. Why not? It just makes sense. […] 
 
 In his account of non-attitudes, Converse (1964) depicted ideological thinking 
as involving explicit awareness of elite perspectives on the connection between 
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various political ideas ("what goes with what"). In contrast, studies of political 
rhetoric suggest that absence of an explicitly worked-through political argument need 
not necessarily indicate the absence of an underlying ideological rationale (Condor et 
al, 2014). On the contrary, the existence of commonplace or orthodox beliefs within a 
particular speech community may be discursively signaled by rhetorical elision. In the 
case of our data set, it was evident that minimal lines of argument in favour of the 
Scottish Parliament tended to rest on an implicit bedrock of shared assumptions about 
political legitimacy, including banal (Billig, 1995) assumptions concerning rights to 
national self determination.  
 What distinguished our more politically sophisticated respondents was not 
their use of ideological reasoning, but their tendency to explicitly mention the core 
political values that informed their opinions (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1981). In the 
stretch of talk reported in extract 6, Vicky is voicing a negative opinion of the 
Scottish Parliament. She reflexively orients to the fact that her views deviate from the 
dominant orthodoxy and, as such, require detailed explanation and justification. 
Vicky’s warrant for her opinion involves an explicit appeal core political values, 
specifically a left-wing internationalist opposition to all forms of political 
nationalism:   
EXTRACT 6 
Vicky Well, (2) I’m not sure how to put it (.) It sounds terrible and I- I  
 can sort of see it from their point of view. You know, I, I, I 
 understand wh- why they want it or think they want it. (.) So erm 
 I do understand how they feel and (.) at at one level I hope it all  
 works out. But another part of me is thinking (.) and it’s not (.) I’m  
 not (.) you know it sounds a bit racist ((laugh)) but as I said my Dad’s  
 from Scotland so I’m half Scottish myself and (2) I dunno (.) eh (3)  
 cos one of my most vivid childhood memories is visiting my cousins  
 in Scotland and how they kept bullying me for being English and I  
 remember being sort of surprised that the grown-ups never said anything  
 about it, it was in fact like it was “ha ha” something funny you know.  
 Obviously, that’s different but at the same time I would have thought  
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 that maybe people should perhaps be working trying to prevent that  
 sort of mindset. And as a Socialist and someone who works a lot 
 with international organizations I don’t like nationalism full stop.  
 And I’m inclined to think that whatever the problems the Scots think  
 they have with the Union nationalism isn’t the solution (3) This current  
 obsession with national identity and divisions isn’t healthy. You just have  
 to look at what’s happened in the Balkans. And I know it probably sounds  
 terrible but I seriously think that to establish a new national parliament  
 just at a time when with Europe there’s some sort of chance that we could  
 really be moving forward (.) looking towards the larger picture (.) well  
 it it all seems rather counterproductive. 
 
  
 In this exchange, Vicky displays her understanding of a range of political 
issues. However, viewed in the context of the interview discussion as a whole, it is 
clear that these references were effectively substituting for domain specific political 
information concerning the Scottish Parliament per se. At no stage in the extract, or 
the three hour interview from which it was drawn, did Vicky ever refer to any specific 
factual information pertaining to UK constitutional change.   
 
Opinion consistency: Empty attitudes as rhetorical constraint. 
 
In his seminal account of non-attitudes, Converse (1964) famously argued that 
uninformed opinions lack ideological constraint, and are therefore subject to random 
variation over time and across contexts. Consequently, it was interesting to note that 
in the panel study element of our research, individuals’ empty attitudes concerning the 
Scottish Parliament were not inclined to vary in response to changes in the 
conversational context, and displayed a remarkable degree of consistency over time. 
This stability was not simply confined to attitude valence. Commonly, people justified 
their opinions on different occasions by drawing from the same stock of 
considerations, lines of argument, exemplary narratives, tropes and clichés.  
For illustrative purposes, let us consider how one particular respondent – Jerry 
- discussed the Scottish Parliament on three separate occasions over a seven-year 
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period. In his first interview (extract 5) Jerry claimed a positive opinion towards the 
new Scottish parliament, a position which we warranted with a reference to the 
existence of a distinctive Scottish identity relayed through the use of active voicing 
(‘We’re not British, we’re Scottish’). Twenty-two months later, Jerry participated in a 
group discussion in which the topic of the Scottish Parliament arose spontaneously: 
EXTRACT 7. 
 
Jerry What’s the matter with Scotland?  
Vicky Nothing’s the matter with Scotland. I’m half Scottish myself. It’s  
 a beautiful place. I just wouldn’t want to live there 
I Because? 
Vicky It’s that, “we’re Scottish, you’re English” mentality.   
Jerry I like that though. If they think of themselves as Scottish, why not?   
Vicky Obviously I don’t mind them thinking of themselves as Scottish. I think  
 of myself as English. But it’s one thing having a sense of identity, and  
 another to be nationalistic.  
Jerry So do you not think there should be a Scottish Parliament, then? 
Vicky I dunno. On the one hand there’s part of me that thinks obviously  
 they voted for it and so I can’t turn round and say to them,  
 as an English person, “no you can’t have it”. But personally I just don’t like  
 nationalism. And I think recently we’ve seen what a dangerous thing  
 nationalism can be and you’d think that it might have made everyone  
 think before just jumping on the bandwagon.  
Jerry But doesn’t that make sense for every nation to rule themselves  
Vicky Er (.) I suppose one reason I do feel so strongly about this is I used  
 to visit my Dad’s family in Scotland as a child, and I HATED it (.) cos  
 my cousins were always on at me about being English. They’d mock my  
 accent and say “English go home” and my Aunt and Uncle were like “Ha  
 isn’t that sweet”. And I think that sort of nationalism can easily come 
 come out in other ways. And in terms of politics I think that at the start of  
 the twenty first century we should be thinking about how to make the  
 world more inclusive how to have more cooperation between people not  
 go back to that nineteenth century idea of every little separate nation for  
 itself.  So no, a Scottish Parliament, Welsh whatever I think it’s a  
 backward step. 
 (3)      
I Do you agree?  
Dan I dunno. I don’t have strong views but I think it’s probably a good thing.  
 A good thing. Scottish people have always had a different way of life to us  
 and so I can understand why they would want to have their own  
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 parliament. They want different things and we want different things  
 because it’s a completely different culture.   
Jerry I agree and, I mean they they themselves (.) the Scots have their own  
 identity (.) And if it was like they said “yes we are UK” and everyone 
 got on  and was happy with it, then I’d be all for y’know. But it’s  
 not like that (.) as you say they’ve got their own culture and they say   
 “we’re Scottish”. So if that means they want their own parliament and  
 their own independence fair enough. It just makes sense for every  
 country to just have it’s own separate parliament.  
 
In this extract we see Jerry again expressing a positive view towards the 
Scottish Parliament, and justifying this opinion with turns of phrase (have their own 
identity, fair enough, it just makes sense) and rhetorical tropes, including the use of 
active voicing to convey a sense of Scottish claims to national identity, which are 
markedly similar to those that he employed in his original interview.   
Similarly, Dan is justifying his opinion through the same non-specific 
reference to life-style differences between England and Scotland that he had used in a 
one-to-one interview two years earlier (extract 4), and Vicky is again justifying a 
negative stance with reference to her principled opposition to political nationalism, 
and employing the same anecdote concerning her childhood experiences as we saw 
her use in extract 6.   
Jerry’s third interview was conducted seven years after his original research 
“chat”. Extract 8 records the stretch of talk that followed after the interviewer had 
directly solicited Jerry’s views on devolution and the Scottish Parliament.  
EXTRACT 8 
I I was just wondering, like we’re interested in what people think about some of 
 the current erm events that have been going on since we last spoke to them 
Jerry Right. OK. 
I One thing is like devolution, and the Scottish Parliament. Do you have maybe 
 any views on that?  
Jerry Yeah well I think it’s right that they should have their own parliament because 
 they they don’t say they are British, they have their own identity. Britain isn’t 
 like Scotland, Wales, England, Northern Ireland all getting on, and if they 
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 want their own parliament, they are separate countries, then yeah it makes 
 sense? Y’know it’s fair enough. 
I Do you think that England should have its own parliament?  
Jerry Yes. If you have a Scottish Parliament, then why not? 
 (2) 
I Do you think that’s- things to do with the Scottish Parliament and whether 
 there should be an English parliament, is that something you’ve maybe 
 changed your mind about at all, over the past few years (.) or not really? 
Jerry I dunno. Um (.) Until you mentioned it just now (.) I don’t know if I’ve 
 thought of it to be honest with you. Um that it’s- it’s not, know what I mean? 
 It’s not something you really hear a lot about, is it? It’s not something you 
 know about. You know, it doesn’t exactly crop up in conversation, does it? 
 “Hello how’s things and by the way you know that thing about devolution-?” 
  ((Laughter)) 
I So how often would you say you discussed this sort of thing? 
Jerry I dunno (2) I’m not sure I ever have to be honest with you.  
 
Years after his first interview, and in a very different kind of research 
context13, Jerry is still claiming positive attitudes towards the Scottish Parliament; he 
is still warranting this stance with reference to the fact that “they…have their own 
identity”, and he is still treating national political self-determination as an 
incontrovertible political value.  
 This kind of consistency over time and across contexts was typical of empty-
attitude formulations, and seemed to be a consequence of the fact that respondents’ 
ability to conceptualize and articulate views was effectively constrained by their 
reliance on a limited set of political considerations and rhetorical heuristics14. This 
observation points to the possibility that there may exist more than one causal route to 
the accomplishment of attitude reliability. On the one hand, the articulation of 
coherent, stable and robust opinions may represent a function of political knowledge 
and active engagement, combined with the capacity to locate a particular issue within 
a more general system of political events, beliefs and values (the process that 
Converse called “ideological constraint”). On the other hand, in so far as instability in 
political attitude avowals may stem from variations in the situational salience of 
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particular political considerations (Zaller, 2002), it would follow that attitude 
inconsistency may also depend upon social actors possessing a reasonably extensive 
repertoire of relevant considerations to apply to a political event or process.  
 
Concluding comments 
 
 In this chapter I have noted a deep-rooted cultural ambivalence in discussions 
of public opinion. On the one hand, public opinion is treated as the ultimate source of 
political authority in direct or representative democracies.  On the other hand, the 
irrational tendencies ascribed to public opinion can be regarded as the antithesis of the 
reasonable judgments required for political decision-making. Survey researchers often 
reify this conceptual ambivalence by distinguishing between two forms of political 
commonsense, exemplified by Converse’s “black and white” model. On the one hand, 
politically sophisticated individuals’ responses to opinion polls reflect genuine 
opinions. Their attitudes are highly crystalized, stable over time, and derived from an 
active engagement with factual information. These “genuine” opinions possess 
internal consistency and are integrated within a general, abstract, ideological frame of 
reference.  On the other hand, the poll responses of less sophisticated individuals 
often take the form of non-attitudes: verbal responses which are not based on factual 
knowledge, or integrated into an abstract system of ideology, and which are subject to 
quasi-random variation depending on question wording and context. 
By exploring the ways in which political opinions are expressed in everyday 
talk, it becomes easier to examine how people actually mobilize political information. 
In this chapter I have focused on a particular class of opinionation, which I termed 
empty attitudes. Superficially, empty attitudes look rather like non-attitudes: they 
involve a speaker adopting a stance for or against a political policy without reference 
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to any domain-specific information. However, once we start to examine the ways in 
which empty attitudes are expressed, we become aware of some notable points of 
similarity with survey researchers’ notion of sophisticated, crystalized, opinions.  
In the data corpus that I have been considering, there were some cases in 
which respondents’ attitude claims involved (“spurious”) verbal responses to 
questions that they did not appear to understand. More often, however, empty 
attitudes comprised sincere (if not especially salient, central or strongly held) 
evaluative stances15.  When respondents were unable to mobilize domain-specific 
information to support their views, they were nevertheless able to draw upon a stock 
of ideological values and knowledge concerning political rights, responsibilities, 
social justice to enable them to formulate their opinion as a justifiable and acceptable 
intervention in a current public controversy.  Individuals who were more actively 
engaged in political life could explicitly mention the political principles on which 
their views were based. However, less politically sophisticated respondents could still 
employ rhetorical heuristics that drew implicitly upon general ideological principles. 
Notwithstanding, or more precisely because of, their lack of issue content, empty 
attitudes could be highly internally coherent and consistent over time, and tended to 
be justified in highly abstract terms. And, in common with many abstract forms of 
social reasoning, empty attitude formulations tended to prioritise deontic issues rather 
than “rational” concerns over personal or group self-interest (Condor, 2012). 
Cognitive psychology perspectives on heuristic political reasoning often adopt a 
deficit model of public opinion. Starting from the assumption that “information is 
critical for citizens to perform their democratic duties”, authors emphasize the 
“shortfalls of shortcuts” (Rogowski, 2013, p. 1).  However, were we to extend 
Gigerenzer’s (2015) perspective on the ecological rationality of heuristic judgments to 
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the field of political opinionation, we might start to appreciate some of the ways in 
which rhetorical heuristics may function to enable social actors to enact the role of 
reasonable democratic citizens in complex modern societies.  
. 
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1 Although I am focussing on modern debates about public opinion, similar concerns 
can be identified in classical debates concerning episteme versus doxa (Barilli, 1989).  
 
2 Mr Hollobone (Kettering) (Con) Hansard 11 Dec 2013: Column 80WH. 
3 Justice Committee - First Report Cutting crime: the case for justice reinvestment. 
House of Commons, 1 December 2009. 
 
4 Mr Wilshire, (Spelthorne) (Con), Hansard 12 Jan 1998 : Columns 89-90. 
 
5 Mr. Luff (Con). Hansard 16 Jan 1998 : Column 63 
 
6 The phrase “settled will of the Scottish people” is a conventionalized formulation, 
first introduced by the Labour Party leader, John Smith. 
 
7 The 2003 British Social Attitudes survey included a 4-item test of knowledge. 
Secondary analysis by the present author indicated a lower than chance level of 
correct response to the four knowledge questions: in England, 72% of respondents 
answered one or no questions correctly. 
 
8 This research was conducted with Jackie Abell, Clifford Stevenson and Stephen 
Gibson. For details of the methodology, see Condor (2010; 2012). 
 
9 This method was chosen to reflect the kinds of situations in which everyday 
discussion of political issues might normally occur (Scheufele, 1999). 
 
10 Collected for the project: Migrants and Nationals, conducted with Frank Bechhofer, 
David McCrone and Richard Kiely at Edinburgh University, funded within the 
Leverhulme Trust Constitutional Change and Identity programme. 
 
11 Transcription symbols: 
 underline  Stress on syllable or word 
 dash-   Abrupt cut off    
 question mark? Rising inflection 
 (2)    Pause measured to the nearest second  
 (.)    Pause of less than one second 
 […]   Omitted material 
 
12 Why not arguments also point to the operation of just world beliefs (Lerner, 1980).  
 
13 This was a telephone interview, taking the form of a direct question-and-answer 
exchange, directed by a different interviewer. 
 
14 This may, of course, have been the result of the respondents’ attempts to appear 
consistent. However, the interviews were deigned to be non-reactive with respect to 
the core topics of our research. Respondents often failed to display any memory of 
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earlier conversations (see e.g. extract 8), and it was notable that their views on issues 
on which they possessed more factual knowledge tended to be far less consistent.   
 15	  Although public opinion researchers typically assume that people develop genuine 
attitudes only through active engagement with relevant information, social 
psychologists argue that people may not require detailed information to develop 
sincere attitudes (e.g. Zajonc, 1980). As Thurstone noted, “the important point for the 
purpose of attitude measurement is that […] vagueness in supplying cognitive detail 
does not in the least invalidate [an individual’s] expression of attitude” (1931, p. 267). 
 
